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THE QUID PRO QUO QUARK: UNSTABLE 
ELEMENTARY PARTICLE OF HONEST SERVICES 
FRAUD 
Brian H. Connor+ 
As Governor of Virginia, Bob McDonnell accepted a $15,000 check for his 
daughter’s wedding, $120,000 in undisclosed loans, a custom golf bag, several 
$300-plus rounds of golf, a $6,500 Rolex inscribed with “71st Governor of 
Virginia,” and an opportunity to drive his benefactor’s Ferrari.1  McDonnell 
argued that this was all perfectly legal under Virginia ethics laws.2  However, 
the federal government contended in its indictment of McDonnell on three 
counts of federal honest services fraud that McDonnell granted his generous 
patron, businessman Jonnie R. Williams, Sr., “favorable official action.”3  That 
“action” included arranging meetings with McDonnell himself and other 
government officials.4 
After McDonnell’s indictment, the former governor’s legal team called the 
prosecution’s argument “a never-before-used legal theory” and insisted that the 
“centuries-old crime of bribery requires” a quid pro quo, or “illicit payments 
made to secure official government benefits.”5  At trial, however, Assistant U.S. 
Attorney Ryan Faulconer insisted that there is no such requirement, stating, “it’s 
not this Ferrari ride for this official meeting.”6  In fact, both parties were correct 
to some degree.  Although the U.S. Supreme Court limited the 18 U.S.C. § 1346 
                                                        
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 
2011, Skidmore College.  The author would like to thank Justice Mark Dwyer of the New York 
State Supreme Court for his guidance and suggestions and the Catholic University Law Review 
staff and editors for their work on this Comment. 
 1. Carol D. Leonnig & Rosalind S. Helderman, Donor Bought Rolex Watch for Virginia 
Governor McDonnell, People Familiar with Gift Say, WASH. POST (June 25, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/donor-bought-rolex-watch-for-virginia-gov-mcdonnell-
people-familiar-with-gift-say/2013/06/25/72ddffa2-ddd2-11e2-b197-f248b21f94c4_story.html; 
Associated Press, Ex-Virginia Governor, Wife Found Guilty of Corruption, PBS NEWS HOUR 
(Sept. 4, 2014, 3:44 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/ex-virginia-governor-wife-
found-guilty-corruption/.  See also Indictment, United States v. McDonnell, No. 3:14-cr-00012-
JRS (E.D. Va. Jan. 21, 2014). 
 2. Leonnig & Helderman, supra note 1. 
 3. Id.; Associated Press, supra note 1; Indictment, supra note 1. 
 4. Associated Press, supra note 1. 
 5. Carol Leonnig & Rosalind Helderman, McDonnell: ‘I Repeat Again, Emphatically, That 
I Did Nothing Illegal,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
mcdonnell-i-repeat-again-emphatically-that-i-did-nothing-illegal/2014/01/21/9be5b4f4-82f4-11e 
3-8099-9181471f7aaf_story.html (emphasis added). 
 6. Trip Gabriel, Debate Over Jury Instructions at Ex-Governor’s Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/us/debate-over-jury-instructions-at-ex-governors-
trial.html?_r=0. 
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honest services fraud doctrine considerably in its 2010 opinion in Skilling v. 
United States,7 the precise transactional dynamic sufficient to constitute honest 
services fraud has been widely interpreted to be an open question.8  Post-Skilling 
defendants have read a quid pro quo requirement into Skilling’s holding, but 
many courts modified this requirement or rejected it outright.9  In McDonnell’s 
case, the jury convicted him of honest services fraud, perhaps reflecting a 
common sensibility—and mirroring the congressional intent that should be 
strictly adhered to by the courts going forward—that exchanges can be corrupt 
regardless of the precision with which the illicit benefits are connected.10 
The federal mail fraud statute from which honest services fraud doctrine is 
derived had innocuous origins.  Congress enacted the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 
in 1872 to prevent the postal system from being used to further criminal 
schemes, prohibiting the use of the mails for “any scheme or artifice to 
defraud.”11  During the twentieth century, however, congressional amendment 
and federal court interpretation expanded the statute’s scope to also prohibit 
schemes to defraud others of their “intangible rights” to “honest services.”12 
The honest services fraud theory proved to be a powerful device in 
prosecuting public officials because any instance in which a public official did 
                                                        
 7. 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
 8. See, e.g., Bridget Rohde & Narges Kakalia, After Supreme Court’s Honest Services Fraud 
Ruling, Questions Remain, N.Y. L.J., July 14, 2010, at 4 (discussing the questions that remain 
regarding honest services fraud in the wake of Skilling). 
 9. See, e.g., Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 17–18, United States v. Bruno, 661 F.3d 
733 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 1:09-cr-29-1), 2011 WL 1461744, at *17–18 (arguing that the government 
must demonstrate an intent to engage in a quid pro quo arrangement).  See also infra Part III.B–D. 
 10. See Jeffrey Bellin, What the McDonnell Verdict Says About U.S. Politics, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-mcdonnell-verdict-shows-how-
easily-prosecutors-may-criminalize-politics/2014/09/05/3128202a-3519-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbe 
a_story.html (discussing the grounds on which McDonnell was convicted); Joshua A. Kobrin, 
Betraying Honest Services: Theories of Trust and Betrayal Applied to the Mail Fraud Statute and 
§ 1346, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 779, 801–02 (2006) (finding that trust in government is an 
essential element of a functioning democratic society, and that a breach of that trust constitutes a 
special and particularly onerous “super breach”).  See United States v. McDonnell, No. 15-4019, 
2015 WL 4153640, at *28–33 (4th Cir. July 10, 2015) (upholding McDonnell’s conviction for 
honest services fraud and holding that the jury was properly instructed that it must find that 
McDonnell received the gifts “corruptly,” that is, contemplating a “specific type of official action 
or favor in return,” that the temporal relationship of the exchanged benefits “constitute compelling 
evidence of corrupt intent,” and that an “official action can include actions taken in furtherance of 
longer-term goals” and “may pertain to matters outside of the bribe recipient's control,” but 
declining to rule on whether “the subjective beliefs of a third party” regarding the bribe recipient’s 
authority over the sought benefit “in an honest-services wire fraud case can convert non-official 
acts [over which the recipient has no actual authority] into official ones”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), cert. granted, 57 U.S. 1 (2016). 
 11. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2926 (discussing the legislative intent 
underlying the statute). 
 12. Joseph E. Huigens, Note, If All Politicians Are Corrupt, But All Defendants Are Presumed 
Innocent, Then What? A Case for Change in Honest Services Fraud Prosecutions, 85 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1687, 1695–98 (2010). 
2015] The Quid Pro Quo Quark 337 
not “exercise his independent judgment in passing on official matters” could fall 
within the ambit of the mail fraud statute, including everything from failure to 
disclose a conflict of interest to blatant transactional bribery. 13   The 
transformation of “one of the oldest federal criminal statutes in continuous use” 
into a powerful doctrinal tool against nearly all forms of public corruption made 
the law a lightning rod of criticism, which centered on the lack of a sufficient 
standard of what conduct constituted deprivation of intangible rights to honest 
services.14  In McNally v. United States,15 the Supreme Court vindicated these 
criticisms, abolishing the doctrine of honest services fraud for vagueness.16 
                                                        
 13. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1362 (4th Cir. 1979), different results reached 
on reh’g, en banc, by an equally divided court, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) 
(describing the mail fraud statute broadly as a principle of “fiduciary” relationship with the public). 
 14. Kristen Kate Orr, Note, Fencing in the Frontier: A Look into the Limits of Mail Fraud, 95 
KY. L.J. 789, 789 (2006–2007).  See also John C. Coffee & Charles K. Whitehead, The 
Federalization of Fraud: Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND 
REGULATORY OFFENSES § 9.01 (Otto G. Obermaier & Robert G. Morvillo eds., 1990) (illustrating 
that federal prosecutors have long followed the maxim: “When in doubt, charge mail fraud”); 
United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 143 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J., dissenting in part) (calling 
the § 1341 honest services fraud doctrine a “freeswinging club” of “political power”).  For criticism 
more focused on the federalism implications of the honest services fraud doctrine, see Peter J. 
Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution of State and Local Corruption, 92 KY. L.J. 75, 
130–31 (2003–2004) (discussing the use of the Hobbs Act to prosecute local officials for bribery); 
George E.B. Holding et al., Federal Prosecution of State and Local Officials Using Honest Services 
Mail Fraud: Where’s the Line?, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 191, 192–93 (2010) (discussing the use of 
the mail fraud statute to prosecute state and local officials); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud 
and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 166–
69 (1994) (discussing U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on the mail fraud statute in connection 
with the intangible rights doctrine).  For criticism of the mail fraud statute’s potential for political 
abuse, see Alexa Lawson-Remer, Note, Rightful Prosecution or Wrongful Persecution? Abuse of 
Honest Services Fraud for Political Purpose, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1289, 1292–93 (2009) (discussing 
the mail fraud statute’s susceptibility to politicization); Huigens, supra note 12, at 1698–1703 
(discussing the passage, use, and jurisprudence of the mail fraud statute from its inception through 
the twentieth century). Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, has 
made prolific use of the doctrine, most recently obtaining convictions of New York State Assembly 
Speaker Sheldon Silver and New York State Senate Majority Leader Dean Skelos.  Mike Vilensky, 
Prosecutor Preet Bharara Shakes Up New York Politics, WSJ (Dec. 11, 2015, 6:26 PM), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/prosecutor-preet-bharara-shakes-up-new-york-politics-1449876382.  The 
sheer number of honest services fraud prosecutions by Bharara’s office has drawn speculation from 
the press that his crack-down on corruption is aimed at advancing his own political ambitions.  See, 
e.g., The Editors, Bharara’s Grand Ambition, N.Y. OBSERVER (Apr. 21, 2015, 10:16 PM), http:// 
observer.com/2015/04/bhararas-grand-ambition/.  Indeed, Bharara’s boasts and rhetoric following 
Silver’s indictment drew harsh criticism from Judge Valerie Caproni, who wrote, in a decision 
denying Silver’s motion to dismiss for prejudicial pretrial publicity, that “In this case, the US 
Attorney, while castigating politicians in Albany for playing fast and loose with the ethical rules 
that govern their conduct, strayed so close to the edge of the rules governing his own conduct.”  
Rich Calder, Silver’s Bid to Dismiss Corruption Charges Denied, N.Y. POST (Apr. 10, 2015, 5:35 
PM), http://nypost.com/2015/04/10/silvers-bid-to-dismiss-corruption-charges-denied/. 
 15. 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
 16. Id. at 356 (noting that “the mail fraud statute . . . does not refer to the intangible right of 
the citizenry to good government”) (emphasis added). 
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Congress responded to McNally by codifying honest services fraud at 18 
U.S.C. § 1346. 17   Section 1346 set the pre-McNally honest services fraud 
doctrine in stone, providing that honest services fraud schemes include 
contrivances that “deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”18  
The statute restored the honest services fraud doctrine and became a favorite 
among prosecutors in public corruption cases, although it is also narrowly 
applicable to private actors.19 
In Skilling, the Supreme Court revisited the honest services fraud doctrine and 
the perennial vagueness concerns that accompanied it, this time as enshrined in 
the statute.20  Although the Court narrowed § 1346 to include only bribery and 
kickback schemes, to the exclusion of activities involving only undisclosed self-
dealing and conflicts of interest, it did not explicitly rule on the requisite 
transactional content of the remaining prohibited schemes—that is, whether the 
law requires proof of a quid pro quo.21  As it stands today, § 1346 prohibits 
corrupt schemes along a spectrum of transactions, with some federal circuits 
requiring more stringent standards of proof of a corrupt transaction, up to and 
including an explicit quid pro quo, and others adopting standards that encompass 
a broader range of conduct not limited to precise quid pro quo exchanges.22 
This Comment begins by tracing the development of the intangible rights 
theory of federal mail and wire fraud statutes from the statutes’ enactment in the 
1870s to the development of honest services fraud doctrine in the 1940s.  It then 
examines the doctrinal developments of pre-McNally case law that were ended 
by that decision, as well as Congress’s intent in enacting § 1346 in order to 
revive the pre-McNally doctrine.  Then, this Comment describes the Supreme 
                                                        
 17. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012)). 
 18. Id. 
 19. John J. Falvey, Jr. & Ryan E. Ferch, Theft of Honest Services: Reining in a Catch-All 
Conflicts Statute, 23 ANDREWS LITIG. REP.: WHITE COLLAR CRIME 1 (2009) (noting that 
“[p]rosecutors love the honest-services statute for the same reasons many courts hate it: [i]t is short, 
vague and capable of seemingly endless elasticity”).  For discussions of the unique problems that 
§ 1346 presents in private sector prosecutions, see generally Michelle V. Barone, Note, Honest 
Services Fraud: Construing the Contours of Section 1346 in the Corporate Realm, 38 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 571, 575–76, 585 (2013) (analyzing the uncertainty that private sector individuals have over 
whether some conduct is criminally liable under § 1346); Anita Cava & Brian M. Stewart, Quid 
Pro Quo Corruption Is “So Yesterday”: Restoring Honest Services Fraud After Skilling and Black, 
12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2011) (expressing the urgency for Congress to speak post-Skilling 
in order to restore to prosecutors the tools to hold accountable bad actors in the business 
community); John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427, 430–32 (1998) (arguing that a distinction should be drawn 
between public and private fiduciaries when interpreting the statute); Andrew B. Matheson, A 
Critique of United States v. Rybicki: Why Foreseeable Harm Should Be an Aspect of the Mens Rea 
of Honest Services Fraud, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 355, 356 (2004) (arguing for a connection 
between private honest services fraud and the mens rea requirement). 
 20. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2928–29 (2010). 
 21. See id. at 2907, 2932. 
 22. See discussion infra Part III.B–C. 
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Court’s limitation of § 1346 in Skilling, its direction that the courts “draw from” 
other bribery statutes in defining the contours of honest services fraud, and the 
subsequent splintering of the circuits regarding the requirement of proving a 
quid pro quo.  Because the courts are split with respect to whether the “draws 
from” statutes require proof of a quid pro quo, this Comment argues that 
Skilling’s instruction to draw from them should not be considered an 
endorsement of a quid pro quo requirement. 
This Comment argues that the differences regarding quid pro quo among the 
circuits should ultimately be resolved in favor of a “stream of benefits” theory 
of bribery.  This theory best comports with congressional intent and the impetus 
of prosecuting public corruption while still remaining within the Supreme 
Court’s narrowed construction of § 1346.  Failing such a circuit-wide adoption, 
the courts should be accommodating to the broad re-characterization of 
traditional bribery schemes as kickbacks, the other theory of honest services 
fraud which Skilling left standing.  Ultimately, the courts should not read an 
explicit quid pro quo requirement into § 1346 because doing so would frustrate 
congressional intent and fail to protect the public from the types of corrupt 
schemes that § 1346 was originally intended to guard against: those in which 
proof of a quid pro quo was elusive, but in which the official had engaged in a 
scheme to defraud the public of its right to the official’s honest services, as 
ultimately determined by a jury. 
I.  PRE-MCNALLY HONEST SERVICES FRAUD DOCTRINE 
The original mail and wire fraud statute, enacted in 1872, prohibited “any 
scheme or artifice to defraud” using the mails.23  The statute was amended in 
1909 to prohibit “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or 
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises.”24  Over the next century, the federal courts of appeals, noting the 
disjunctive phrasing of the statute as amended, began to read the statute as 
prohibiting schemes or artifices that deprived others of “intangible rights” 
separately from and in addition to those which deprived the victims of money or 
                                                        
 23. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).  See also Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (statement 
of Rep. Farnsworth) (stating that the law is designed “to prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten 
up in the large cities . . . by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving 
and fleecing the innocent people in the country”). 
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (emphasis added); Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2908.  The mailing element 
has been practically abandoned, now serving only as a “jurisdictional hook.”  United States v. 
Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 722–23, 723 n.5 (1st Cir. 1996).  See also Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should 
Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 
435, 438 (1995) (noting that “[o]ver the past two decades . . . use of the mail fraud statute shifted 
away from its traditional application of protecting against misuse of the mails [and] . . . . became a 
strategic tool in fighting political corruption and increasingly sophisticated economic misconduct . 
. . regardless of the mailing’s relationship to the underlying scheme”). 
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property.25  This intangible rights theory permitted the prosecution not only of 
schemes to deprive others of money or property, but also—in what came to be 
the theory’s most contentious application—schemes to defraud the public of its 
intangible right to public officials’ “honest services.”26  The intangible rights 
theory departed from traditional theories of fraud because it did not rest on the 
violation of economic expectations, but rather on the breach of the “political 
contract” in which citizens elected the official “to act for the common good.”27 
In Shushan v. United States,28 the first articulation of the intangible rights 
theory of federal mail fraud, the Fifth Circuit ruled that a public official was 
guilty of such a scheme when the official accepted a bribe from contractors 
seeking favorable treatment from the city.29  The court rejected the argument 
that the prosecution failed to prove intent to defraud because the city actually 
saved money by awarding the contract and because the contract might have been 
awarded notwithstanding the pecuniary benefits.30  The official, the Shushan 
court ruled, had perpetrated a scheme that defrauded the public by depriving it 
of its right to his honest services, a decision that spurred the development of 
“honest services fraud” doctrine.31 
Similar to intangible rights theories found by courts in other federal fraud 
statutes,32 a victim of honest services fraud need not suffer property or pecuniary 
loss, and may in fact materially benefit from the scheme.33  The actionable harm 
                                                        
 25. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2926; Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941) 
(stating that a scheme to corrupt a public official can constitute a scheme to defraud). 
 26. Falvey, Jr. & Ferch, supra note 19, at 2 (observing that “[i]n the 1970s and 1980s 
prosecutors increasingly used the honest-services theory under the mail and wire fraud statutes to 
prosecute public officials”).  See also Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2926 (discussing the development of 
the honest services doctrine from Shushan); Shushan, 117 F.2d at 115 (theorizing about what would 
come to be known as the honest services doctrine). 
 27. Orr, supra note 14, at 797 (quoting United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 442 (8th Cir. 1996)).  
See also Robert Gray, Comment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political-Corruption 
Prosecutions Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 562, 563 (1980) (noting 
that federal courts have applied the mail fraud statute where “corrupt politicians did not deprive the 
citizens of anything of economic value” but rather “their rights to honest government”). 
 28. 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941). 
 29. Id. at 119, 121.  See also Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2926. 
 30. Shushan, 117 F.2d at 119. 
 31. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2926 (discussing the holding in Shushan).  See also United 
States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1362 (4th Cir. 1979), different results reached on reh’g, en banc, 
by an equally divided court, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (noting that “the fraud 
involved in the bribery of a public official lies in the fact that the public official is not exercising 
his independent judgment in passing on official matters”).  See also United States v. Ganim, 510 
F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that a scheme or artifice to deprive another of property is 
“traditional mail fraud”). 
 32. See Lawson-Remer, supra note 14, at 1296–97 (listing other, non-mail fraud offenses for 
which intangible rights serve as the basis of prosecution, including voting fraud and employee 
fraud). 
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Plyler, 222 U.S. 15, 16–17 (1911) (holding that the government 
is not required to prove “actual financial or property loss” to convict a defendant who forged civil 
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results from the perpetrator depriving the victim of his right to the perpetrator’s 
honest services, which, in the case of a public official, is a component of the 
official’s general fiduciary duty to the public. 34   The courts affirmed, and 
prosecutors relied on, this theory of honest services fraud in cases in which there 
was no evidence of an explicit quid pro quo.35  Quid pro quo is an “intent to 
receive a specific benefit in return for payment,”36 as was required under other 
statutes proscribing bribery of public officials.37  As a result, the honest services 
fraud doctrine both included, and distinguished between, cases in which bribery 
was present and cases in which there was no quid pro quo but the scheme 
nevertheless defrauded the public.38  Some judges have criticized this theory of 
                                                        
service applications of fraud); United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 79–80 (1915) (holding that 
the government need not prove actual financial loss where the defendant impersonated a federal 
official because the purpose of the prohibiting statute was to maintain the dignity of federal offices); 
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2926. 
 34. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2932; Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1362. 
 35. Lawson-Remer, supra note 14, at 1300 (“Because actual pecuniary loss to the public was 
not always evident in the public corruption cases, prosecutors relied on the theory of honest services 
fraud . . . . [and] courts upheld application of the mail fraud statute to situations in which politicians 
did not deprive citizens of anything of economic value . . . .”)  (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(internal citations omitted).  See also, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 724 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(holding that “undisclosed, biased decision making for personal gain, whether or not tangible loss 
to the public is shown, constitutes a deprivation of honest services”). 
 36. United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1013 (4th Cir. 1998) (describing the type of 
intent that satisfies the “corrupt intent” requirement of § 201 bribery).  See also 18 U.S.C. § 
201(b)(2) (2012) (prohibiting the bribery of government officials). 
 37. Andrew M. Stengel, Albany’s Decade of Corruption: Public Integrity Enforcement After 
Skilling v. United States, New York’s Dormant Honest Services Fraud Statute, and Remedial 
Criminal Law Reform, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (2012–2013) (noting that § 1346 was used to 
prosecute breaches of the public trust where the conduct involved did not rise to the level of outright 
bribery); Steven Wisotsky, Honest Services Fraud After Skilling v. United States, 12 ENGAGE: J. 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 31, 31 (2011) (noting that the Skilling court acknowledged that 
most cases involved public officials, but private-sector honest services fraud is also an issue 
reviewed by the courts).  For examples of bribery statutes that require a quid pro quo, see Lawson-
Remer, supra note 14, at 1300 (2009) (finding that prosecution may be difficult under bribery and 
extortion theories because of the lack of evidence of a quid pro quo).  Section 201(b) bribery 
requires proof of a quid pro quo.  See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 
398, 404–05 (1999) (stating that § 201 bribery requires proof of a quid pro quo and illegal gratuities 
under the statute requires proof of a sufficient nexus of reciprocity).  The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
1951, also requires proof of a quid pro quo (at least in the campaign contribution context).  
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273–74 (1991) (holding that § 1951’s requirement that 
extortion be “under color of official right” prohibits only those situations where a public official 
accepts a contribution in exchange for an explicit promise to perform an official act).  See also 
Lauren Garcia, Curbing Corruption or Campaign Contributions? The Ambiguous Prosecution of 
“Implicit” Quid Pro Quos Under the Federal Funds Bribery Statute, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 229, 
234 (2012) (quoting Henning, supra note 14, at 130) (noting that the Hobbs Act was originally 
designed to combat organized crime but became a popular and powerful statute for combating 
public corruption because it was initially successfully construed as prohibiting a mere “‘acceptance 
of an unauthorized benefit . . . under color of official right’”). 
 38. Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941) (holding that “[a] scheme to 
get a public contract on more favorable terms than would likely be got otherwise by bribing a public 
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the public’s intangible right to officials’ honest services for reasons of 
vagueness,39 and the theory succumbed to a vagueness challenge in McNally.40 
In McNally, a public official arranged for an appointee to receive a share of 
the appointee’s commissions in the form of kickbacks paid to the companies in 
which the official had an interest. 41   The official was convicted of honest 
services fraud under the intangible rights theory. 42   The Supreme Court, 
however, dismissed the intangible rights reading of the statute in favor of one 
that does not leave its “outer boundaries ambiguous.”43  Instead of finding that 
the second phrase, “or for obtaining money or property,” implied that the 
preceding “scheme[s] or artifice[s] to defraud”44 were not limited to money or 
property, the Court held that the common meaning of “defraud,” harming one’s 
property rights, combined with Congress’s intent in amending the statute in 
1909, confined the statute to protecting property rights.45 
The McNally Court held that the second phrase was there merely to instruct 
that this deprivation of property rights was also prohibited when conducted 
through “pretenses, representation[s], or promises,” in addition to schemes or 
artifices.46  The Court held that the intangible rights theory of the honest services 
fraud doctrine required a reading of the statute that was unconstitutionally vague 
because it did not sufficiently define the conduct that would place the actor in 
jeopardy.47  The Court limited honest services fraud to the protection of property 
rights, stating that the law “does not extend to the intangible right of the citizenry 
                                                        
official would not only be a plan to commit the crime of bribery, but would also be a scheme to 
defraud the public”). 
 39. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (“The mail fraud statute clearly 
protects property rights, but does not refer to the intangible right of the citizenry to good 
government.”); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 142–43 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winters, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1361).  Judge Winters protested: 
Juries are . . . left free to apply a legal standard which amounts to little more than the 
rhetoric of sixth grade civics classes.  One searches in vain for even the vaguest contours 
of the legal obligations created beyond the obligation to conduct governmental affairs 
“honestly” or “impartially,” to ensure one’s “honest and faithful participation” in 
government and to obey “accepted standards of moral uprightness, fundamental honesty, 
fair play and right dealing.” 
Id.  See also Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2936 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (inveighing that 
“[n]one of the ‘honest services’ cases . . . defined the nature and content of the fiduciary duty central 
to the ‘fraud’ offense”). 
 40. McNally, 483 U.S. at 356. 
 41. Id. at 352–53. 
 42. Id. at 355 (finding that “the mail fraud statute proscribes schemes to defraud citizens of 
their intangible rights to honest and impartial government”). 
 43. Id. at 360. 
 44. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 45. McNally, 483 U.S. at 358. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. at 356, 358, 360. 
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to good government,” and “[i]f Congress desires to go further, it must speak 
more clearly than it has.”48 
II.  SECTION 1346 IN THE PRE-SKILLING ERA 
Congress spoke, but perhaps not as clearly as the Court demanded.49  In 1988, 
following McNally, Congress enacted § 1346, known as the “honest services 
fraud” statute, which included within the ambit of § 1341’s schemes or artifices 
to defraud those schemes which deprive “another of the intangible right of 
honest services.”50  The stated purpose of the law was to restore the honest 
services fraud doctrine as it existed prior to McNally.51  The federal circuits 
reached varying interpretations of § 1346 following its enactment, generating 
several splits on fundamental elemental questions.52  Among these differences 
between the courts of appeals’ treatment of honest services fraud under § 1346 
                                                        
 48. Id. at 356, 360 (noting that an expansive interpretation of the statute would involve the 
federal government impermissibly setting standards of good government for local and state officials 
whereas the new interpretation would not have such a harsh punitive effect).  For more about honest 
services fraud and federalism, see Anthony Gaughan, The Case for Limiting Federal Criminal 
Jurisdiction over State and Local Campaign Contributions, 65 ARK. L. REV. 587, 588–90 (2012) 
(arguing that prosecutors should “exercise caution” in seeking out and prosecuting violations in the 
“murky” and “highly partisan” arena of campaign finance); Ellie Neilberger, Federal Prosecution 
of Public Corruption at the State and Local Level, 84 FLA. B.J. 82, 82–86 (2010) (giving an 
overview of the public honest services fraud doctrine). 
 49. Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204, 1205 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of 
cert.) (remarking that “[w]hether that terse amendment qualifies as speaking ‘more clearly’ or in 
any way lessens the vagueness and federalism concerns that produced this Court’s decision in 
McNally is another matter”). 
 50. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012) (stating “[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or 
artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest 
services”). 
 51. 134 Cong. Rec. S17,376 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (statement of Sen. Biden).  Sen. Biden 
stated: 
This section overturns the decision in McNally v. United States in which the Supreme 
Court held that the mail and wire fraud statutes protect property but not intangible rights. 
. . .  The intent is to reinstate all of the pre-McNally case law pertaining to the mail and 
wire fraud statutes without change. 
Id.  See also 134 Cong. Rec. 33,296–97 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers) 
(noting that because of McNally many prosecutions of public officials for severe misconduct, 
including bribery, were dismissed because there was no pecuniary harm to any victim); Cava & 
Stewart, supra note 19, at 6 n.27 (discussing Sen. Biden’s analysis of the amendment in the 
Congressional Record). 
 52. Cava & Stewart, supra note 19, at 7–10 (finding that the circuit courts are split regarding 
fundamental elements such as the requisite mens rea, harm to the victim, the contours of the duty 
which was breached, and whether federal or state law controls the statute’s meaning and defines 
susceptible conduct); J. B. Perrine & Patricia M. Kipnis, Navigating the Honest Services Fraud 
Statute After Skilling v. United States, 72 ALA. LAW. 294, 296 (2011) (noting that § 1346 created 
an even more expansive honest services fraud doctrine due to the flexibility of the language). 
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was the requirement of proving a quid pro quo in prosecutions under a bribery 
theory, or varying degrees thereof.53 
Looking to federal bribery statutes for guidance, the Ninth Circuit in United 
States v. Kincaid-Chauncey54 held that honest services fraud under a bribery 
theory required proving a quid pro quo, which is an explicit exchange of a 
payment with intent to influence an official’s conduct.55  In Kincaid-Chauncey, 
a county commissioner accepted payments from the agent of a strip club in 
Nevada in exchange for loosening regulations on adult entertainment businesses 
and other favorable legislative acts.56  The court upheld the jury instructions 
because they contained “at least an implicit quid pro quo,” holding that a quid 
pro quo was required to be proved in such a transaction because “[w]ithout a 
link between” the payments and the actions, the statute would criminalize 
perfectly legitimate lobbying activities.57 
In United States v. Kemp,58 the Third Circuit also held that honest services 
fraud bribery theories require proof of a quid pro quo, but differed with the Ninth 
Circuit’s requirement of finding implicit links between benefits and official 
actions by holding that such proof could come in the form of a “stream of 
benefits.” 59   Under the “stream of benefits” theory, the government is not 
required to link each gift with a specific official act, but can instead satisfy the 
quid pro quo requirement by showing that “a course of conduct of favors and 
gifts” flowed to an official in exchange for “a pattern of official actions favorable 
to the donor.”60 
                                                        
 53. Falvey, Jr. & Ferch, supra note 19, at 3 (noting that while the Ninth and Third Circuits 
adopted some form of a quid pro quo requirement in honest services fraud prosecutions pursuing a 
bribery theory, the First Circuit required only evidence of a payment in exchange for “long-term 
favorable treatment”). 
 54. 556 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 55. Id. at 943 (distinguishing between the necessary exchange of money for official acts, or 
quid pro quo, and the “mere intent to curry favor” inherent in “legitimate lobbying”).  But see id. 
at 940–41 (stating in dictum that “imposing a quid pro quo requirement on all § 1346 cases risks 
being under-inclusive, because some honest services fraud, such as the failure to disclose a conflict 
of interest where required, may not confer a direct or easily demonstrated benefit”).  Cf. J. Kelly 
Strader, Skilling Reconsidered: The Legislative-Judicial Dynamic, Honest Services Fraud, and the 
Ill-Conceived “Clean Up Government Act,” 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 309, 313, 322 (2011) (arguing 
that the statute is redundant because most crimes it prohibits fall within other federal criminal 
statutes); see also Randall D. Eliason, Surgery with a Meat Axe: Using Honest Services Fraud to 
Prosecute Federal Corruption, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 929, 985 (2009) (finding that 
federal prosecutors turned to the relatively broad and possibly unconstitutionally vague § 1346 
because federal courts had significantly narrowed the federal bribery and gratuities statutes). 
 56. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d at 927–29. 
 57. Id. at 943. 
 58. 500 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 59. Id. at 282. 
 60. See id. (quoting United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1014 (4th Cir. 1998)).  The 
court noted that “payments [to the official] may be made with the intent to retain the official’s 
services on an ‘as needed’ basis, so that whenever the opportunity presents itself the official will 
take specific action on the payor’s behalf.”  Id. (quoting Jennings, 160 F.3d at 1014). 
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In United States v. Sawyer,61 the First Circuit concluded that a mere unlawful 
gratuity with the “expectation of long-term favorable treatment” satisfies the 
statute, and § 1346 therefore does not require proof of a specific quid pro quo.62  
The defendant in Sawyer had provided copious payments and luxuries to 
Massachusetts state legislators in violation of Massachusetts’s illegal gratuity 
statutes.63  The court held that the lobbyist’s repeated gratuity offenses aimed at 
garnering favorable treatment could constitute honest services fraud.64 
The federal courts of appeals have held that the statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague, despite frequent challenges on those grounds. 65  
Indeed, with respect to the scope of the statute, the courts of appeals largely 
restored the non-bribery theories of honest services fraud typical of pre-McNally 
case law.66  The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Weyhrauch,67 observed that 
with § 1346, Congress intended to restore the pre-McNally honest services fraud 
doctrine.68  With respect to misconduct by public officials, such misconduct was 
comprised of “two core categories” of fraud: (1) bribery and kickbacks and (2) 
“nondisclosure of material information.”69 
                                                        
 61. 85 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 62. Falvey, Jr. & Ferch, supra note 19, at 3 (citing Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 730). 
 63. Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 726. 
 64. Id. at 730. 
 65. See, e.g., United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated and 
remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).  Weyhrauch was ultimately vacated and remanded for further 
proceedings in light of the Skilling decision.  Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2971 
(2010).  See also Matthew Modell, (Dis)honest Services Fraud: “Bad Men, Like Good Men, Are 
Entitled To Be Tried and Sentenced in Accordance with Law,” 32 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 131, 149 
(2010) (stating that “[m]any circuits . . . have found . . . reasons to reject challenges of § 1346 as 
being unconstitutionally vague”). 
 66. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 1296–97 n.16 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(discussing Congress’s purpose for restoring the pre-McNally honest services fraud doctrine in 
enacting § 1346); United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 144–47 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding § 1346 
constitutional against a vagueness challenge, reasoning that it can be interpreted in accordance with 
pre-codification understanding of the crime); Perrine & Kipnis, supra note 52, at 296 (noting that 
courts’ expansive interpretation of § 1346 proved “particularly useful” in prosecuting public official 
corruption).  But see Lawson-Remer, supra note 14, at 1306.  Lawson-Remer insists: 
[R]everting to the pre-McNally case law is not as simple as the statute’s legislative history 
implies.  Not only does the pre-McNally case law fail to capture a coherent definition of 
honest services fraud and differ greatly from circuit to circuit, but the ever-expanding 
body of case law also includes successful prosecutions that many now regard as 
overreaching and no longer within the statute. 
Id. 
 67. 548 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).  
Weyhrauch was ultimately vacated and remanded for further proceedings in light of the Skilling 
decision.  Weyhrauch, 130 S. Ct. at 2971. 
 68. Id. at 1246 (finding that “Congress demonstrated a clear intent to reinstate the line of pre-
McNally honest services cases when it enacted § 1346”). 
 69. Id. at 1247. 
346 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:335 
Likewise, in United States v. Walker, 70  the Eleventh Circuit upheld the 
conviction of a Georgia state legislator who received business favors.71  Despite 
a lack of evidence that the lawmaker actually influenced legislation in exchange 
for the favors, the court held that the jury could infer the requisite intent to 
defraud.72  Returning to the broad, pre-McNally scope of honest services fraud, 
the court held that a public official breaches his fiduciary duty to the public when 
he “uses his office for personal gain,” which includes bribery or benefits from 
an undisclosed conflict of interest, and which consequently does not require 
proof of a quid pro quo.73 
The still broad and varying interpretations of the honest services fraud 
doctrine and its codifying statute among the circuits invited the same criticisms 
of vagueness that plagued it before McNally and prompted another review of the 
doctrine by the Supreme Court in Skilling.74  In Skilling, the Supreme Court once 
again considered a vagueness challenge to the statute, and once again attempted 
to rein in pre-McNally honest services fraud doctrine, holding that the broad 
scope of the doctrine did not describe the prohibited conduct with sufficient 
specificity.75 
III.  SKILLING LIMITS § 1346 TO BRIBES AND KICKBACKS 
In Skilling, Jeffrey Skilling, an Enron executive, was charged with honest 
services fraud for deceiving Enron’s shareholders while simultaneously 
enriching himself and other executives by overstating the company’s value.76  
The trial court found that Skilling had deprived Enron and its shareholders of 
their right to his honest services and sentenced him to 292 months’ imprisonment 
and $45 million in restitution.77  The Fifth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that 
Skilling had engaged in self-dealing at the expense of the corporation’s interests, 
but declined to address Skilling’s due process claims based on the vagueness of 
§ 1346. 78   Reversing Skilling’s conviction for honest services fraud, the 
Supreme Court reconciled Skilling’s due process claims, and the Court’s 
                                                        
 70. 490 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 71. Id. at 1287–88, 1301. 
 72. Id. at 1297–98. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Perrine & Kipnis, supra note 52, at 296.  See also Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 
2896, 2904–06 (2010) (discussing Skilling’s challenge in the context of the history of § 1346); 
supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 75. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928. 
 76. Id. at 2907–08. 
 77. Id. at 2911, 2912 (observing that the trial court found that “[t]he jury was entitled to 
convict Skilling” on these elements: “‘(1) a material breach of a fiduciary duty [and] . . . (2) that 
results in a detriment to the employer,’ including one occasioned by an employee’s decision to 
‘withhold material information, i.e., information that he had reason to believe would lead a 
reasonable employer to change its conduct’”). 
 78. Id. at 2912; United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 546–47 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
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longstanding suspicion of honest services fraud, with the “presumptive validity 
that attaches to an Act of Congress”79 by confining the statute to its “paramount 
applications”: 80  “fraudulent schemes to deprive another of honest services 
through bribes or kickbacks.”81 
The Court rejected as too vague the tenets of pre-McNally doctrine that had 
been restored subsequent to the enactment of § 1346 in instances that did not 
include bribery or kickbacks.82  The Court noted that honest services fraud only 
protects “that ‘intangible right of honest services,’ which had been protected 
before McNally, not all intangible rights of honest services whatever they might 
be thought to be.”83  The Court limited the honest services statute to bribery and 
kickbacks, instructing that it “draws content . . . from” both pre-McNally case 
law and from federal statutes proscribing and defining “similar crimes.”84  In 
reversing Skilling’s conviction for honest services fraud, the Court emphasized 
the lack of an exchange in Skilling’s scheme, suggesting to some courts and 
attorneys that a quid pro quo was necessary under the narrower bribery and 
kickback theories.85 
A.  The Inconsistent “Draws From” Statutes 
The Court in Skilling noted several statutes that should inform courts’ 
application of § 1346 to bribery or kickback schemes: 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), 
                                                        
 79. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928 (quoting United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 
29, 32 (1963)). 
 80. Id.; Perrine & Kipnis, supra note 52, at 296 n.5 (noting that Justice Scalia in particular 
was unconvinced of even McNally’s ability to save the doctrine from unconstitutional vagueness); 
Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204, 1208 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).  
Scalia dissented: 
In light of the conflicts among the Circuits; the longstanding confusion over the scope of 
the statute; and the serious due process and federalism interests affected by the expansion 
of criminal liability that this case exemplifies, I would grant the petition for certiorari and 
squarely confront both the meaning and the constitutionality of § 1346. 
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 81. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928 (emphasis added).  After the Skilling decision, Senator Patrick 
Leahy (D-VT) introduced the ultimately unsuccessful Honest Services Restoration Act, which 
would have restored the prohibition on undisclosed self-dealing.  Honest Service Restoration Act, 
S. 3854, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010).  See also Ashley Southall, Justice Department Seeks a Broader 
Fraud Law To Cover Self-Dealing, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2010) at B3, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/09/29/business/29fraud.html?_r=0. 
 82. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928–31. 
 83. Id. at 2929 (quoting United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 137–38 (2003) (en banc)). 
 84. Id. at 2933. 
 85. Id. at 2934.  See, e.g., United States v. Bruno, 661 F.3d 733, 743 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(suggesting that Skilling now mandated quid pro quo); United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 
1174 n.21 (11th Cir. 2011) (“After Skilling, it may well be that the honest services fraud statute . . 
. requires a quid pro quo in a campaign donation case.”); Stengel, supra note 37, at 1400 (remarking 
that “[a]fter Skilling the federal statute [§ 1346] requires a benefit and a quid pro quo”); Brief of 
Defendant-Appellant at 46–47, United States v. Bruno, 661 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1885), 
2010 WL 5474601, at *46–47 (arguing that Skilling states a quid pro quo requirement). 
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defining bribery of federal officials;86 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), defining bribery 
concerning federal programs;87 and 41 U.S.C. § 52(2) (now codified at 41 U.S.C. 
§ 8701(2)), defining kickbacks in federal contracts.88  But these statutes are of 
little help in answering the question of whether honest services fraud under a 
bribery theory requires proof of a quid pro quo because they are in fact at odds 
with each other regarding a quid pro quo requirement.89 
In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California,90 a trade association 
that represented fruit growers delivered more than $5,000 in illegal gratuities to 
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Michael Espy.91  The district court held that the 
government was not required to prove a specific connection between the 
gratuities and any action by the federal official under § 201(c).92  Instead, it was 
sufficient that the government demonstrate that the defendant conferred the 
gratuities on the official “because of his [official] position.”93  The D.C. Circuit 
reversed the district court, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an 
illegal gratuity must be given because of a past or future official act.94  The Court 
further noted that only a bribe requires a specific quid pro quo—a specific intent 
to confer a benefit in exchange for an official act.95 
Although the Court has found § 201(b) bribery to require an explicit quid pro 
quo, no such consensus has emerged among the federal circuits regarding § 
666.96  In United States v. Jennings,97 for example, the Fourth Circuit held that 
the district court erred in omitting from the jury instruction the requirement of 
finding an explicit quid pro quo in a § 666 bribery prosecution of a contractor 
                                                        
 86. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933; 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012). 
 87. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933; 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2). 
 88. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933–34; 41 U.S.C. § 8701(2) (2012) (formerly codified at 41 
U.S.C. § 52(2) (2006)). 
 89. George D. Brown, Stealth Statute-Corruption, the Spending Power, and the Rise of 18 
U.S.C. § 666, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247, 307–08 (1998) (noting that § 666 has assumed a vast 
scope partly because of broad interpretations among some circuits which have held that it also 
prohibits gratuities offenses which lack a requirement of quid pro quo in addition to bribery). 
 90. 526 U.S. 398 (1999). 
 91. Id. at 400–01. 
 92. Id. at 402–03. 
 93. Id. (quoting United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 941 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 
(D.D.C. 1996), rev’d, 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998), aff’d, 526 U.S. 398 (1999)). 
 94. Id. at 404–05, 414. 
 95. Id.  See also United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144, 146, 148–49 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming 
the § 201(b) and § 201(c) convictions of a produce wholesaler who made payments to a government 
inspector in exchange for lower produce grades by declining to extend the § 201(b) bribery 
requirement of a quid pro quo to § 201(c) illegal gratuities). 
 96. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 406 (noting that the 
expression “official act” in § 201(a) requires, in addition to a quid in bribery cases, “that some 
particular official act be identified and proved” as the quo); Garcia, supra note 37, at 254–55 (noting 
that only two of the federal circuit courts of appeals require a quid pro quo in § 666 prosecutions). 
 97. 160 F.3d 1006 (4th Cir. 1998). 
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who delivered a series of payments to a housing authority official.98  The court 
reasoned that the government must identify the illicit benefits conferred by the 
contractor, and the official acts taken by the housing authority official in 
exchange for such benefits, in order to show that there was an intent to engage 
in a relatively specific quid pro quo.99  Otherwise, the court noted, § 666 would 
improperly extend to any benefit conferred with a “generalized desire to 
influence or reward . . . no matter how indefinite or uncertain the payor’s hope 
of future benefit.”100 
The Fourth Circuit’s requirement that the quid and quo be explicit, or 
identified specifically as pro one another, contrasts with the Second Circuit’s 
approach to § 666.101  In United States v. Ganim,102 the Second Circuit held that 
a conviction under § 666 requires proof of a quid pro quo, but rejected the 
defendant mayor’s contention that the government was required to link each 
benefit he had received from prospective city contractors with a specific official 
act he had taken in the award process.103  Instead, the court held that a mere 
promise to perform official acts in exchange for the accepted benefits was 
sufficient to satisfy the quid pro quo requirement, reasoning that a narrower 
reading of the quid pro quo requirement would “legalize some of the most 
pervasive and entrenched corruption, and cannot be what Congress intended.”104 
The Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have held that § 666 does not 
require proof of a quid pro quo.105  In United States v. McNair,106 for example, 
the Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant’s contention that the district court 
had erred in failing to instruct the jury that it must find a quo for the $350,000 a 
                                                        
 98. Id. at 1020–21. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Compare United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1013, 1020 n.5 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(discussing the necessity of a quid pro quo), with United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 136–37 
(2d Cir. 2007) (holding that there need not be a “direct link” between benefits received and acts 
performed). 
 102. 510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 103. Id. at 136–37. 
 104. Id. at 147 (upholding convictions under §§ 666, 1341, 1346, and 1951 by declining to 
extend Sun-Diamond Growers’s requirement that the past or future official act for which the reward 
was given be identified as bribery under the aforementioned statutes in order to be an illegal 
gratuity). 
 105. See, e.g., United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1188 (11th Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 515, 520 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholding the § 666 conviction of a former city 
administrator who received a free subdivision lot from a land developer in exchange for future 
unspecified official acts and holding that proof of a quid pro quo is not necessary by noting the 
statutory language’s absence of such a requirement); United States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 714 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (holding that proof of a legislator’s specific official act taken in exchange for more than 
$200,000 from a state contractor was not necessary and that a jury’s finding that the contractor had 
bought the legislator’s influence was sufficient under § 666). 
 106. 605 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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county commissioner received from city contract seekers.107  The court first 
looked to the statutory language and, finding no requirement of a specific quid 
pro quo therein, reasoned that such a requirement would permit any corrupt deal 
as long as the briber pays off the official for a future, unidentified official act.108  
The court noted that the word “corruptly” in the statute sufficiently defines the 
impermissible conduct as intent to influence or be influenced and declined to 
adopt the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Jennings that the words “corrupt intent” in 
the statute contain the requirement of intent to “engage in any specific quid pro 
quo.”109 
The final “draws from” statute, 41 U.S.C. § 52(2), was presumably offered to 
be informative on the scope of the kickback theory of honest services fraud that 
Skilling left open.110  Although it addresses federal contracts, § 52(2)’s definition 
of kickbacks is expansive, covering even the “purchase of good will,” with no 
requirement that the payments be linked to certain actions.111 
The federal courts of appeals, although following Skilling’s instructions, 
diverged in their requirement of a quid pro quo in § 1346 prosecutions because 
of these and other pre-Skilling splits that were not resolved by that decision.112 
                                                        
 107. Id. at 1168, 1187–88. 
 108. Id. at 1187–88, 1190–91 (declining to extend Sun-Diamond Growers’s § 201 illegal 
gratuities standard to § 666 bribery because the latter includes rewards for “any business, 
transaction, or series of transactions,” rather than for “official act[s],” and upholding § 1346 
convictions on either bribe or undisclosed conflict of interest theories) (internal citations omitted).  
The court stated: 
[T]he Second Circuit’s analysis [in Ganim] lies somewhere beyond a no-quid pro quo 
requirement, as adopted by the Sixth, Seventh, and now the Eleventh Circuits, and the 
Fourth Circuit’s requirement. While the Second Circuit requires a quid pro quo, that 
requirement is satisfied by a quid (thing of value) in exchange for a promise to perform 
an unidentified, official act at some point in the future.  In other words, in the Second 
Circuit the quo need not be specific or even identifiable at the time of the quid, and to 
that extent the Second Circuit arguably supports our conclusion.  And to some extent, 
confusion reigns in this area because courts often use the term quid pro quo to describe 
an exchange other than a particular item of value for a particular action. 
Id. at 1190. 
 109. Id. at 1188–89 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2933–34 (2010). 
 111. 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Works and Contracts § 108 (2015).  The treatise states: 
[T]he gist of a crime . . . is the receipt of a prohibited payment with knowledge that such 
payment is made for the purpose of inducing the award of a subcontract . . . .  [T]he 
question whether the recipient actually induced the award of a subcontract . . . has been 
held irrelevant since the statute prohibits the purchase of good will in the awarding of 
“negotiated” government contracts. 
Id. 
 112. See supra Part III.B–D. 
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B.  Eleventh Circuit: Failure To Instruct on Quid Pro Quo is Harmless if the 
Scheme is Corrupt 
In Stayton v. United States,113 the U.S. District Court for the Middle District 
of Alabama set aside a conviction under § 1346 in light of Skilling’s new 
requirements.114  The court held that the jury instruction was overbroad, and 
therefore it was impossible to determine whether the jury had convicted the 
defendants on newly required bribery or kickback grounds, or impermissible 
undisclosed conflict of interest or self-dealing grounds.115   In reaching this 
holding, the court pointed to the defendants’ acquittals on standalone bribery 
charges as dispositive of the verdict’s basis on an impermissible non-bribery or 
non-kickback theory, suggesting that the elements of honest services fraud on a 
bribery theory are largely indistinguishable from § 666, which the Eleventh 
Circuit has found not to require proof of a quid pro quo.116 
Similarly, in United States v. Siegelman,117 the Eleventh Circuit reversed two 
counts of honest services fraud against Alabama Governor Don Siegelman 
predicated on theories of self-dealing.118  At the same time, the court upheld the 
conviction of Alabama Governor Don Siegelman under § 1346 on a bribery 
theory despite the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that it must find a quid 
pro quo.119  The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that because the jury also convicted 
Siegelman of bribery under § 666 from a jury instruction charging a quid pro 
quo (provided in response to the defendant’s request, although not required by 
the Eleventh Circuit), any failure to instruct the jury as to the necessity of 
proving a quid pro quo to convict under § 1346 was harmless error. 120  
Furthermore, the court added that while it did not read a general quid pro quo 
requirement into honest services fraud after Skilling, it conceded that in cases 
involving campaign contributions, a quid pro quo might be required in order to 
protect the donor’s First Amendment rights.121 
Mirroring the decision of the district court in Stayton, the Eleventh Circuit in 
Siegelman equated the proof requirements of § 666 with that of a bribery theory 
                                                        
 113. 766 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (M. D. Ala. 2011). 
 114. Id. at 1269. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1269 n.9; Perrine & Kipnis, supra note 52, at 298 (quoting Stayton, 766 F. Supp. 2d 
at *25 n.10) (noting that “the Court also mentioned that its ruling did not mean that either man was 
‘actually innocent’ of honest services fraud, and that the government could elect to retry one or 
both men for honest services fraud”).  See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text. 
 117. 640 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 118. Id. at 1172–74, 76. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1172–74. 
 121. Id. at 1174, n.21 (noting in dicta that “[a]fter Skilling, it may well be that the honest 
services fraud statute, like the extortion statute in McCormick, requires a quid pro quo in a 
campaign donation case”).  For a more detailed exploration of the requirement of proving quid pro 
quo in the campaign contribution context, see generally Garcia, supra note 37. 
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of honest services fraud.122  However, it ultimately declined to decide whether 
the prosecution must prove a quid pro quo in a § 1346 action.123  In United States 
v. Spellissy,124 the court acknowledged both that it had declined to explicitly rule 
on whether honest services fraud requires proof of a quid pro quo in Siegelman, 
and that the lack of a quid pro quo instruction may not be harmless without a 
corresponding bribery charge.125  The court nevertheless denied the petitioner’s 
writ of error coram nobis on harmless error grounds because the prosecution was 
“premised on a bribery or kickback scheme,” further suggesting a rejection of 
any express quid pro quo requirement in honest services bribery cases.126 
C.  Second Circuit: Quid Pro Quo is an Essential Element, Mere “Magic 
Words,” and Entirely Disposable if the Bribe Looks Like a Kickback 
In United States v. Bruno,127 former New York State Senate Majority Leader 
Joseph Bruno had been charged and convicted by a district court of honest 
services fraud for accepting consulting fees from a nanotechnology firm in 
exchange for assisting the firm in obtaining government funding. 128   The 
Supreme Court decided Skilling while Bruno awaited appeal.129  Subsequently, 
the Second Circuit vacated the conviction and dismissed the indictment of 
honest services fraud against Bruno because the government had declined to 
pursue a bribery theory and instead elected to charge Bruno under a theory of 
failure to disclose a conflict of interest.130  Skilling foreclosed conviction under 
this theory.131 
The court then evaluated the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether 
Bruno was entitled to a judgment of acquittal in the event that the evidence was 
insufficient to support an honest services fraud conviction under a bribery or 
kickback theory in a new trial.132  In making this assessment, the court described 
evidence of a quid pro quo as “an essential element of a bribery theory of honest 
services fraud.”133  The court ruled that a rational jury, provided with identical 
evidence at retrial, could find evidence of a quid pro quo, noting that such an 
exchange could be inferred from “evidence of benefits received and subsequent 
favorable treatment, as well as from behavior indicating consciousness of 
                                                        
 122. See Siegelman, 640 F.3d at 1173–74. 
 123. Id. 
 124. 438 F. App’x 780 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 125. Id. at 782. 
 126. See id. at 784 (emphasis added). 
 127. 661 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 128. Id. at 736. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 740. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 742. 
 133. Id. at 743. 
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guilt.”134  The court also seemed to embrace the Third Circuit’s “stream of 
benefits” theory, wherein the precise quids and quos need not be matched nor 
agreed upon in advance, and the requirement can be satisfied by showing that 
the agreement contemplated reciprocal action as “opportunities arise,”135 which 
largely comports with the Second Circuit’s holding in Ganim—that the quid pro 
quo requirement in § 666 can be satisfied by an exchange of a promise to bestow 
benefits.136 
In a contrasting set of facts in United States v. Botti,137 the Second Circuit 
upheld the conviction of a real estate developer who had been convicted of 
honest services fraud for conferring illegal benefits on the city’s mayor in 
exchange for favorable treatment from the city’s zoning board.138  Botti argued 
that in light of Skilling, the “general theory” of honest services fraud, as 
represented in the jury instruction, rendered the instruction defective because it 
did not specifically charge a bribery theory.139  Although the jury failed to reach 
a verdict on § 666 bribery, which in the Second Circuit required finding only 
that the bribery had conferred corrupt benefits on an official with an intent to 
influence that official in the performance of his official duties, the district court 
held that this outcome did not demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to 
find Botti guilty of honest services fraud under a bribery theory.140  The Second 
Circuit held that, although it was plain error for the lower court to fail to limit 
the honest services fraud jury instruction to bribery or kickback schemes, such 
an error did not substantially affect the defendant’s rights because the bribery 
theory was the only theory supported by the evidence or argued at trial.141  In so 
holding, the Second Circuit noted that “[i]t was unnecessary for the District 
Court ‘to use the magic words . . . ‘quid pro quo’ to effectively charge a jury on 
bribery,’” suggesting an unwillingness to read Skilling as an endorsement of quid 
pro quo as a definitional element of honest services fraud.142 
The Second Circuit has not only downplayed the extent to which a quid pro 
quo is an essential element of honest services fraud, but has seemed to accept 
the kickback theory, as articulated in § 52(2), as an alternative in § 1346 
prosecutions where no exchange is apparent or where the precise dynamic of the 
                                                        
 134. Id. at 744 (quoting United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 554 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
 135. Id. (citing United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 2007)).  See also Part III.D 
(discussing the “stream of benefits” theory). 
 136. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 137. 711 F.3d 299 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 138. Id. at 303. 
 139. Id. at 307. 
 140. Id. at 305, 307 (noting that in Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009), the Supreme 
Court had instructed courts not to attribute any meaning to the failure to return a verdict). 
 141. Id. at 311. 
 142. Id. at 314 (quoting United States v. Bahel, 662 F.3d 610, 635 (2d Cir. 2011)) (holding that 
“it was unnecessary for the District Court ‘to use the magic words “corrupt intent” or “quid pro 
quo” to effectively charge a jury on bribery’”). 
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exchange is elusive.143  In United States v. Nicolo,144 a local official pled guilty 
to a count of honest services fraud for accepting frequent payments from a real 
estate consultant, but at his plea hearing he specifically denied that these 
payments had induced him to alter his official actions.145  On appeal of his plea 
agreement after Skilling, the official argued that he had not “knowingly” entered 
into the plea agreement because he had not engaged in a quid pro quo sufficient 
to violate § 1346 under the bribery theory indicated by his sentence.146  The court 
affirmed the official’s conviction on the grounds that his conduct was sufficient 
to convict him of honest services fraud under a kickback theory, citing Skilling’s 
directions to look to § 52(2).147  The Second Circuit, therefore, has demonstrated 
a willingness to employ the kickback theory liberally, including, apparently, in 
cases where the precise exchange constituting the quid pro quo falls through.148 
D.  Third Circuit: “Stream of Benefits” and No Requirement of Official Action 
The Third Circuit has held that honest services fraud under a bribery theory 
does require proof of a quid pro quo.149  In United States v. Bryant,150 a New 
Jersey state senator was charged under a bribery theory of § 1346 for taking a 
“low-show” job at a university in exchange for official actions to increase the 
university’s funding.151  The court upheld the senator’s conviction, applying the 
requirements of § 201(b) as articulated by the Supreme Court in Sun-Diamond 
                                                        
 143. See Gary Stein & Eli J. Mark, Gratuities and Honest Services Fraud, BUS. CRIMES 
BULLETIN, Sept. 2014, at 1 (noting that some courts, including the Second Circuit, have begun to 
adopt a broad “kickback” theory).  See also infra notes 144–48 and accompanying text. 
 144. 421 F. App’x 57 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 145. Id. at 60, 63. 
 146. Id. at 64 (holding that to “knowingly” enter a plea agreement only means to be aware of 
the consequences of the agreement). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id.  See also Brian Nichilo, Honest Services Fraud: Constancy in Change, 83 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1065, 1089 (2011) (noting that bribery is generally easily susceptible to recharacterization as 
a kickback); United States v. McDonough, 727 F.3d 143, 153 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. 
Ct. 1041 (2014) (quoting Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2932 (2010)) (upholding § 
1346 convictions on the grounds that a lobbyist’s delivery of money to the speaker of a state 
legislature in exchange for political favors was a “classic kickback scheme”); United States v. 
Renzi, No. CR 08-212 TUC DCB (BPV), 2012 WL 983580, *6–7 (D. Ariz. Mar. 22, 2012) 
(rejecting the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the congressman’s conviction under § 1346 
be reversed in light of Skilling on grounds that his scheme to promote favorable land exchange 
legislation in exchange for payments stemming from the land sale constituted not merely a 
foreclosed self-dealing but a “paradigmatic bribery and kickback case”).  The Second Circuit also 
appears to be amenable to expanding the scope of what constitutes a kickback.  See United States 
v. DeMizio, 741 F.3d 373, 380 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that a stockbroker’s requirement that firms 
doing business with his employer employ his family members in return for increased business 
constituted kickbacks sufficient to sustain a conviction under § 1346 despite his not receiving any 
direct benefits). 
 149. United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 240–41 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 150. 655 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 151. Id. at 236–37. 
2015] The Quid Pro Quo Quark 355 
Growers of California.152  The court held that conviction under a bribery theory 
of honest services fraud does not require an explicit quid pro quo, but can instead 
be proved by an implied quid pro quo, which can take the form of a “stream of 
benefits.” 153   The government need not prove that a particular quid was 
exchanged for a particular quo; instead, the government need prove only that 
benefits flowed to a public official in exchange for a “pattern of official actions 
favorable to the donor.”154 
The court also noted that Skilling did not alter the existing rule that the 
government need not prove that the recipient performed the official action for 
which the bribe was taken, but only that the bribe was accepted with requisite 
intent to be influenced.155  Therefore, according to the Third Circuit, in order to 
convict a defendant of honest services fraud under a bribery theory, the 
government need show only that an official accepted benefits with the intent to 
be influenced.  This effectively disposed of the requirement that the government 
prove even an implied quid pro quo.156 
IV.  SEARCHING FOR THE “CRITERION OF GUILT”  
Although Skilling precluded honest services fraud theories involving merely 
undisclosed conflicts of interest and self-dealing, the Court left unresolved the 
extent to which the remaining bribery and kickback theories require proof of a 
quid pro quo.157  The federal courts of appeals differed in their quid pro quo 
requirements in pre-Skilling § 1346 cases premised on bribery, or “core” pre-
McNally honest services fraud doctrine.158  Skilling purportedly limited § 1346 
                                                        
 152. Id. at 240–41, 243.  See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 
404–05 (1999) (distinguishing bribery, which requires specific intent to influence or be influenced, 
from a gratuity, which requires that a benefit be given or accepted “for or because of” an official 
act).  See also United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 281 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Sun-Diamond 
Growers, 526 U.S. at 404–05) (“[Sun-Diamond Growers’s distinction between a gratuity and a 
bribe] is equally applicable to bribery in the honest services fraud context, and we thus conclude 
that bribery requires ‘a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an 
official act.’”). 
 153. Bryant, 655 F.3d at 241. 
 154. Id. (quoting United States v. Bryant, No. 3:07-cr-267, 2009 WL 1559796, at *4 (D.N.J. 
May 28, 2009)).  See also Kemp, 500 F.3d at 281–82 (affirming the lower court’s application of the 
“stream of benefits” theory of bribery in the conviction of a city treasurer who accepted payments 
in exchange for directing contracts to companies favored by the payor).  Kemp noted that “while 
the form and number of gifts may vary, the gifts still constitute a bribe as long as the essential 
intent—a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act—
exists.”  Id. 
 155. Bryant, 655 F.3d at 245. 
 156. See id. (noting that Skilling only prohibited theories that went “beyond” the core of bribery 
or kickbacks and did not limit traditional theories of bribery, one of which is the “stream-of-benefits 
theory”). 
 157. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2939 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 158. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text. 
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to this “core” doctrine. 159   Moreover, the courts of appeals differ in their 
requirements of a quid pro quo for the “draws from” statutes.160  Thus, the extent 
to which a quid pro quo is necessary, and the precise conduct sufficient to sustain 
a conviction under § 1346, remains elusive. 
A.  No Consensus on Quid Pro Quo Among the Circuits Before or After 
Skilling 
The federal courts of appeals’ approaches to honest services fraud post-
Skilling differ appreciably in the degree to which they require a quid pro quo.  
The Eleventh Circuit in Siegelman, for instance, declined to state whether 
conviction under § 1346 required proof of a quid pro quo.161  Furthermore, the 
court held that because the defendant was convicted of § 666 bribery, any failure 
to instruct the jury as to § 1346’s purported post-Skilling quid pro quo 
requirement was harmless error because the instructions on the reception of 
benefits and the intent to influence would presumably have been duplicative.162 
This differs markedly from the Second Circuit’s approach, which has 
characterized proof of a quid pro quo as an “essential element” in honest services 
fraud based on bribery. 163   The Second Circuit declined to extend to the 
defendant in Botti the inferential benefit that a § 666 bribery instruction was 
effectively coterminous with an instruction on bribery-based honest services 
fraud, holding that the jury’s failure to find the defendant guilty of bribery was 
not detrimental to finding sufficient evidence for a conviction for honest services 
fraud.164 
The Third Circuit’s approach also differs from that of the Second and Eleventh 
Circuits.  While the Third Circuit applied Sun-Diamond Growers’s quid pro quo 
requirements for § 201 to the § 1346 prosecution in Bryant, its “stream of 
benefits” theory, combined with the rule that no official action need have been 
taken, effectively reduces the quid pro quo requirement to a mere quid, or merely 
“magic words” devoid of substance.165  If a quid pro quo can be implicit, and 
the official action need not be taken, then any conferral of a benefit with intent 
to influence, or any quid, would seem to constitute a quid pro quo in the Third 
                                                        
 159. Lisa Kern Griffin, The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1815, 
1840 (2011) (noting that “‘[b]ribes and kickbacks’ are not self-defining, and it is not clear that the 
Supreme Court intended them as terms of art.  Some bribery statutes require that payments influence 
particular official actions, but not all pre-McNally bribery cases involved quid pro quos”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 160. See supra Part III.A. 
 161. United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1173–74 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 162. Id. 
 163. United States v. Bruno, 661 F.3d 733, 743 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Ganim, 
510 F.3d 134, 148–49 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 164. United States v. Botti, 711 F.3d 299, 305, 307, 314–15 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 165. United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2011); Botti, 711 F.3d at 314 (quoting 
United States v. Bahel, 662 F.3d 610, 635 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
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Circuit, and resemble a kickback more than a bribe.  Because the courts cannot 
read Skilling in consensus as not requiring a quid pro quo for honest services 
fraud, they should adopt a bribery doctrine that limits this proposed limiting 
factor by following the Third Circuit’s approach. 
B.  Skilling’s Commands Are Further Obfuscated by the Transposability of the 
Kickback Option 
Courts can also preserve the scope of pre-McNally honest services fraud by 
drawing from 41 U.S.C. § 52(2) kickbacks.  Section 52(2) defines a kickback as 
“any money, fee, commission, credit, gift, gratuity, thing of value, or 
compensation of any kind that is provided . . . to improperly obtain or reward 
favorable treatment.”166  The breadth of this definition contrasts starkly with the 
definition of bribery in § 201(b), which the Supreme Court has stated is defined 
by its essential intent element.167  As the Second Circuit has apparently noted, 
because § 52(2) defines kickback so broadly and carries no intent element, the 
statute would presumably undermine the utility of pursuing any conviction on a 
bribery theory when a kickback theory could be more easily employed to avoid 
the requirement of proving a quid pro quo.168 
Adopting wholesale the standards of the other statutes, namely § 201(b) and 
§ 666 bribery, the former of which strictly requires a quid pro quo, would render 
§ 1346 redundant.169  It would also frustrate the congressional intent of restoring 
honest services fraud to its pre-McNally scope and application, which was 
primarily prosecuting official indiscretion that did not manifest a quid pro quo 
character.170  Absent a circuit-wide or Supreme Court adoption of the Third 
Circuit’s “stream of benefits” theory, or a total repudiation of quid pro quo in 
honest services fraud doctrine, the divergent requirements of proving a quid pro 
quo among the federal courts of appeals, and that ever-elusive “criterion of 
guilt,” will frustrate both congressional intent and the Supreme Court’s 
presumed reinstatement of “core” pre-McNally doctrine.171  In order to bring 
certainty that the Skilling decision failed to provide and avoid the vagueness that 
Congress and pre-McNally doctrine is accused of fostering, courts should adopt 
                                                        
 166. 41 U.S.C. § 8701 (2012) (formerly codified at 41 U.S.C. § 52(2) (2006)). 
 167. Compare id. (not discussing an intent requirement), with 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) 
(requiring intentionality); United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 
(1999) (distinguishing that while bribery requires “intent ‘to influence,’” a gratuity requires that 
something be “given or accepted ‘for or because of’ an official act”). 
 168. See supra Part III.C. 
 169. See Thomas Rybarczyk, Comment, Preserving a More Perfect Union: Melding Two 
Circuits’ Approaches To Save a Valuable Weapon in the Fight Against Political Corruption, 2010 
WIS. L. REV. 1119, 1141. 
 170. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2939 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (arguing that “[i]t is entirely clear (as the Court and I agree) that Congress meant to 
reinstate the body of pre-McNally honest-services law; and entirely clear that [it] prohibited much 
more . . . than bribery and kickbacks”). 
 171. Id. at 2931.  See also id. at 2939 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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an honest services fraud approach that successfully reconciles these competing 
criticisms while effectuating the initial congressional intent of battling public 
corruption regardless of its precise transactional manifestation. 
V.  RESTORING AN OLD DOCTRINE BY DISPENSING WITH A NEW LIMITATION 
The circuits’ divergent treatment of the essentiality of proving a quid pro quo 
in honest services fraud demonstrates that, despite Skilling’s purported clarifying 
interpretation, a range of different approaches to § 1346 honest services fraud 
persist among the federal courts of appeals.  This circuit split perpetuates the 
problems long identified with honest services fraud doctrine, particularly the 
vagueness for lack of defining conduct.172  Meanwhile the initial impetus and 
congressional intent underlying the enactment of § 1346 persists, as courts and 
legislators have conveyed that a range of behavior can deprive citizens of their 
right to officials’ honest services.173 
A.  Courts Should Adopt the Third Circuit’s “Stream of Benefits” Approach in 
Order to Avoid Vagueness and Effectuate Congressional Intent 
Does Skilling truly “accomplish[] Congress’s goal” in enacting § 1346 as the 
Court claimed in that decision?174  As seen in Bruno, Bryant, and Siegelman, 
post-Skilling inclusivity and vagueness concerns can turn on a given court’s 
adoption, rejection, or modification of the quid pro quo requirement.175  Because 
the pre-Skilling case law on § 1346 and the federal courts of appeals’ treatment 
of the “draws from statutes” diverge in their requirement of a quid pro quo, 
Skilling should not be read as identifying a quid pro quo as the “criterion of 
guilt” in honest services fraud prosecutions.176 
                                                        
 172. Id. at 2938 (urging that “the first step in the Court’s analysis—holding that ‘the intangible 
right of honest services’ refers to ‘the honest-services doctrine recognized in Court of Appeals’ 
decisions before McNally—is a step out of the frying pan into the fire”). 
 173. See supra notes 51 and 55.  See also Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928 (finding that “[t]here is 
no doubt that Congress intended § 1346 to refer to and incorporate the honest-services doctrine 
recognized in Court of Appeals’ decisions before McNally derailed the intangible-rights theory of 
fraud”). 
 174. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2907, 2933 (2010) (quoting Brief of Albert W. 
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*4–5.  The defendant-appellant argued: 
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Id. 
 176. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2939 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Instead, courts should adopt a standard for honest services fraud which 
respects the limitations and guidance of Skilling by adhering to pre-McNally 
honest services fraud doctrine, but which also does not defeat the congressional 
intent of restoring that doctrine by applying a quid pro quo requirement that was 
not essential to the doctrine pre-McNally. 177   By employing a “stream of 
benefits” theory and requiring only that the official accept the bribes with intent 
to be influenced, the Third Circuit’s approach remains within Skilling’s anti-
vagueness parameters while effectuating congressional intent and advancing the 
interests of society in prohibiting corruption. 
B.  The “Stream of Benefits” Theory Comports with Public Notions of 
Corruption and Empowers the Public To Determine When It Has Been 
Deprived of its Right to Officials’ Honest Services 
Modern social science and public opinion depart from the Supreme Court’s 
notions of what behavior constitutes improper influence and official action in a 
democratic society, viewing corruption as a more nuanced and systemic 
phenomenon capable of taking various forms.178  This is quite different from the 
Supreme Court’s focus on quid pro quo as the primary criterion of corruption.179  
Honest services fraud, historically and into the present in certain jurisdictions, 
serves the essential function of punishing what social scientists have identified 
and the public perceives as a potentially more insidious and almost certainly 
more widespread form of corruption: that of non-transactional influence, or non-
quid pro quo corruption.180 
                                                        
 177. See supra notes 35–37, 51 and accompanying text. 
 178. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 179. Compare Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 357, 359 (2010) 
(stating that “we now conclude that independent expenditures, including those made by 
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Id. 
 180. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign 
Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 119 (2004) 
(finding that many Americans perceive the government and the political process as corrupt, but for 
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and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 564, 564 (2014) (finding that “economic 
elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts 
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Because the honest services fraud statute seeks to punish officials for behavior 
that defrauds the public of its right to the officials’ honest services, it ought to 
comport with the public’s beliefs of what constitutes corruption.181   Of the 
approaches to honest services fraud taken by the courts of appeals in the 
aftermath of Skilling, the Third Circuit’s “stream of benefits” theory best meets 
this imperative by treating the influence that was bought, rather than the precise 
benefits exchanged, as the “criterion of guilt.” 
C.  Prosecutors Can and Should Bypass Quid Pro Quo Requirements by 
Showing a Paradigmatic Narrative of Corruption 
Reading Skilling to require a quid pro quo is also ultimately futile.  Whether 
or not courts adopt the “stream of benefits” theory, prosecutors will flout 
whatever quid pro quo requirement Skilling may have imposed by charging 
corruption under novel honest services fraud theories.  The Skilling decision may 
have been a “good day for the bad guys,” but workarounds exist even in 
jurisdictions that have adopted a quid pro quo post-Skilling, whether by 
borrowing from § 201, § 666, or pre-Skilling bribery and kickback cases.182  In 
the Second Circuit, for example, the court’s reference to quid pro quo as “magic 
words,” gives prosecutors leeway to construct an honest services fraud theory 
that need only fit within a traditional bribery narrative.183  Likewise, the Second 
Circuit’s apparent openness to recharacterization of bribery as a kickback 
scheme signals that the best route for prosecutors might be simply to avoid the 
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Weigh in on Medicaid and Budget Shortfall, ROANOKE COLL. (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www. 
roanoke.edu/about/news/rc_poll_virginians_think_mcdonnell_behavior_typical (finding that most 
Virginians thought former Governor McDonnell should face time in prison for his public corruption 
charges); Rybarczyk, supra note 169, at 1124 (advocating a “public-trust preserving, private-gain 
standard” for post-Skilling honest services fraud doctrine that would apply where “a public official 
corruptly misused his or her position to create an economic gain for himself or for an individual 
that the official personally knows”). 
 182. John W. Shoen, High Court Upends Widely Used Anti-Fraud Law, MSNBC (June 25, 
2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37905334/ns/business-us_business; Nichilo, supra note 
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provisions” and comparable state provisions targeting official corruption and that § 1346 is 
ultimately superfluous and its invalidation would not present any setbacks to the prosecution of 
federal or state corruption). 
 183. United States v. Botti, 711 F.3d 299, 314 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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bribery and quid pro quo questions altogether and liken each corrupt scheme to 
a § 52(2) kickback in any given jurisdiction.184 
As for the lack of specificity regarding the type of conduct exposing one to  
§ 1346 prosecution, “a criminal defendant who participated in a bribery or 
kickback scheme, in short, cannot tenably complain about prosecution under  
§ 1346 on vagueness grounds.”185  In other words, if the charged scheme fits 
within the paradigm of a prohibited exchange, as defined by an expansive 
doctrine going back to the 1940s and reaffirmed by Congress as late as 1988, 
then it is a scheme to defraud the public of its intangible right to the official’s 
honest services.186 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In order to further clarify the duty owed to the general public by public 
officials in § 1346 honest services fraud prosecutions, the Supreme Court or the 
federal courts of appeals should adopt the Third Circuit’s unique “stream of 
benefits” approach to honest services fraud bribery.  This approach identifies the 
public official’s receipt of a benefit and intent to be influenced, rather than the 
existence of a precise corrupt exchange, as the criterion of guilt.  Because pre-
McNally honest services fraud doctrine did not identify quid pro quo as the 
criterion of guilt, the “stream of benefits” approach’s emphasis on intent rather 
than precise exchange best retains the utility of the pre-McNally honest services 
fraud doctrine in prosecuting corruption and best effectuates the congressional 
intent in enacting § 1346, while still remaining within the parameters of non-














                                                        
 184. Griffin, supra note 159, at 1840–41 (arguing that even if the “stream of benefits” theory 
or an implicit quid pro quo requirement are not acceptable, “the definition of ‘kickbacks’ appears 
broad enough” to encompass most corrupt schemes). 
 185. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2934 (2010). 
 186. See supra Parts I–II. 
362 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:335 
 
 
 
 
